500 Cards v1.10 serial key or number

500 Cards v1.10 serial key or number

500 Cards v1.10 serial key or number

500 Cards v1.10 serial key or number



Mobile Computing Platform

Intel® Core™ i7-8565U 1.8GHz

processor with Turbo Boost Technology

up to 4.6GHz

8MB Intel Smart Cache


Intel Core i7-8665U vPro™ 1.9GHz processor

with Turbo Boost Technology up to 4.8GHz

8MB Intel Smart Cache


Intel Core i5-8265U 1.6GHz processor

with Turbo Boost Technology up to 3.9GHz

6MB Intel Smart Cache


Intel Core i5-8365U vPro™ 1.6GHz processor

with Turbo Boost Technology up to 4.1GHz

6MB Intel Smart Cache

11.6″ IPS TFT LCD FHD (1920 x 1080)
800nits LumiBond® display with Getac sunlight readable technology
Capacitive multi-touch screen

8GB DDR4 expandable to 32GB
Optional SSD  256GB / 512GB / 1TB

LED backlit membrane keyboard
Optional Rubber Keyboard

– Capacitive multi-touch screen
– Optional dual mode touchscreen (multi-touch and digitizer)
– Glide touchpad with left-click and right-click buttons

SD Card Reader x 1
Smart Card reader x 1
Optional 1D/2D imager barcode readeri

FHD webcam x 1 or Optional Windows Hello face-authentication camera (front-facing) x 1
Serial port (9-pin; D-sub) x 1
Headphone out / mic-in Combo x 1
DC in Jack x 1
USB 3.0 x 1
USB 3.1 Gen 2 Type-A x 2
LAN (RJ45) x 1
HDMI x 1
Docking connector x 1
Optional 8M pixels auto focus rear camera x1
Optional RF antenna pass-through for GPS, WLAN and WWAN

10/100/1000 base-T Ethernet
Intel® Dual Band Wireless-AC 9260; 802.11ac
Bluetooth (v5.0)ii
Optional dedicated GPS
Optional 4G LTE mobile broadband
Optional 4G LTE mobile broadband (EM7455)
Optional 4G LTE for FirstNet / Verizon Responder Private Core (EM7511)

Getac Utility
Getac Camera
Getac Geolocation
Getac Barcode Manager
Optional Absolute DDS® Persistence

Optional Intel® vPro™ Technology
TPM 2.0
Optional HF RFID and contactless Smart Card readeriii
Optional fingerprint scanner
Kensington lock

AC Adapter (65W, 100-240VAC, 50/60 Hz)
Li-Ion battery (11.1V, typical 2100mAh; min. 2040mAh) x 2
LifeSupport™ battery swappable technology

313 x 238 x 39 mm (12.32″ x 9.37″ x 1.53″),
2.1 Kg (4.63 lbs)iv

Rugged FeatureTemperature

MIL-STD-810G certified and IP65 certified
MIL-STD-461G certifiedv
Optional ANSI/ISA 12.12.01
Optional Salt fog certified
Vibration & drop resistant
e-Mark certified for vehicle usage

Environmental Specification

– Operating: -21°C to 60°C / -5.8°F to 140°F
– Storage: -51°C to 71°C / -60°F to 160°F
– 95% RH , non-condensing

Carry bag
Multi-Bay Charger (Dual Bay)
Multi-Bay Charger (Eight-Bay)
Vehicle adapter (120W, 11-32VDC)
MIL-STD-461 certified AC adapter (90W, 100-240VAC)
Digitizer Pen
Capacitive Stylus (Hard-tip)
Protection film
X Strap
Shoulder Strap (2-point)
Main battery (11.1V, typical 2100mAh; min. 2040mAh)
AC adapter (65W, 100-240VAC)
Vehicle dock
Office dock

i SD Card Reader with Smart Card reader and optional 1D/2D imager barcode reader are mutually exclusive.
ii Bluetooth performance and connectable distance may be subject to interference with the environments and performance on client devices, users may be able to reduce effects of interference by minimizing the number of active Bluetooth wireless devices that is operating in the area.
iii 13.56MHz Contactless HF RFID/NFC reader
(ISO 15693, 14443 A/B, Mifare and FeliCa™ compliant).
iv Weight and dimensions vary from configurations and optional accessories.
v MIL-STD-461G 90W AC adapter sold separately.
vi Tested by a national independent third party test lab following MIL-STD-810G
Источник: [https://torrent-igruha.org/3551-portal.html]
, 500 Cards v1.10 serial key or number

Tech FAQs

Our Technical Support Department has collected some of the most commonly asked questions that we hope will assist you. Please feel free to contact us at 888-4DMPTEC (436-7832) if your question has not been answered.

You can find these guides and more at dmp.com/guides or by clicking here. Click here for the General Troubleshooting Guide.

Programming: To access panel programming on DMP control panels, reset the control panel by shorting the RESET header or pressing the RESET button on the panel. At a keypad, press 6-6-5-3 (P-R-O-G). If the keypad says "ENTER CODE" after pressing P-R-O-G, enter the lockout code that was programmed by the original installing company. *XR panels need 2-3-1-3+CMD

Diagnostics: To access diagnostics on DMP control panels, reset the control panel by momentarily placing a jumper on J16 and then remove it where it’s only placed on one pin. At a keypad,  press 2-3-1-3 (D-I-A-G). The keypad screen will display DIAGNOSTICS. *XR panels need 2-3-1-3+CMD

Keypad Options: To gain access to the keypad options on the 7800 Graphic Touchscreen Keypad, scroll through the carousel on the keypad until "Options" is displayed and select it. When the Options icon is pressed the keypad will display settings for brightness, tone, and volume. Tap the wrench icon and the keypad will display "ENTER CODE"- press 3-5-7-7 (I-N-S-T) CMD and that will show KPD OPT, KPD DIAG, and STOP. Select KPD OPT to enter the keypad options menu. 

On all control panels manufactured by DMP prior to 2020 the default user code is 99. We STRONGLY encourage all DMP dealers to change this user code once the installation is finished. As of 2020 the default user code is generated at DMP and is printed on the box. Initializing user codes will revert the default code to 99.

For XR panels, the default user code has profile 99 assigned to it. This is the default master profile. XT and XTL panels have authority levels instead of profiles. The default user has the master authority level assigned to it.

When a keypad displays "WIRELESS TROUBLE," this means one of two things:
1) The panel and wireless receiver are not transmitting data back and forth. The power, RXD and TXD LEDs can be used to verify power and communication at the receiver. On XR Series panels, the X-Bus Status option in the diagnostics menu will test communication with the receiver. If a software version appears on the screen, that means the panel is currently communicating with the receiver.

2) The tampers are not being depressed on the wireless receiver. The 1100X-W and 1100XH-W wireless receivers, which are compatible with any XR100/500 or XR150/350/550, are equipped with a case tamper and a wall tamper.


XR Series Panels: User Menu --> System Status

XT Series Panels: Diagnostics (2313) --> Panel Settings



Compatible Panel & Minimum Firmware


XR100/500 v211 9/21/12



XR100/500 v212 3/15/13

XR100/500 v212 3/15/13


263C (Enfora Chipset)

XT30/50 v112 XR150/350/550

XT30/50 v112 XR150/350/550

263C (Telit Chipset)

XT30/50 v124 1/21/16 XR150/350/550 v109 8/18/2015


263LTE-V XT30/50 v183 1/10/19 XR150/350/550 v183 12/20/18

263LTE-A XT30/50 v192 8/23/18 XR150/350/550 v193 12/19/19


XR500 v213 11/21/18


XTLPlus/XTLTouch 265LTE-V v183 1/10/19

XTLPlus/XTLTouch 265LTE-A v192 8/23/18

1) The Dealer Admin site can be used to update XR150/550, XTLplus and XTLTouch panels over network or cell, and XT30/50 panels if the panel is Level M or higher. This can be done individually or with the Bulk Update option.

2) A 399 serial cable can be used to update any of our systems using Remote Link, this includes the CellCom/iCom/DualCom communicators. Refer to the Remote Link help files for details on connecting.

3) Remote Link can update panels over a network. The XR100/500, 150/350/550, XTLplus, XTLTouch, and XT30/50 Level M or higher can be updated using the panel’s network connection.

4) The Model 400 USB Flash Module can be used to update XT30/50, XTLplus, and CellCom/iCom/DualCom systems.

Version 107 or later: To update the firmware, download the firmware update from DMP's Dealer Direct Software Downloads and unzip the file onto a FAT32 formatted Micro-SD card. Insert the card into the slot on the right of the keypad, then power cycle the keypad or select Restart in the keypad options.

Version 106 or earlier: To have the firmware updated in the 7800 or 9800 series keypads, simply use the Customer Repair Center with instructions to update to the latest firmware and send it in to DMP.

This is done in the Communication section of the panel programming menu. Set the panel account number and press CMD until prompted to enter the path number. Enter the path number (1 for example) and press CMD. Choose a communication type: None, DD (Digital Dialer), NET, CID (Contact ID), or CELL. Continue to configure the other settings for this path. When prompted, enter the phone number or IP address of the central station receiver.

There are two ways to test DMP wireless communication:
The first option is the wireless walk test. Reset the control panel by shorting the RESET header or pressing the RESET button on the panel. Then, at a keypad, press 8-1-4-4 (W-A-L-K) CMD. Press CMD until the WLS option is displayed, and select it. By pressing the WLS option on the screen this will begin a wireless check-in test. The panel will attempt to check-in with each transmitter that is currently programmed and will show the status on the screen of how many transmitters are checking in. When the test ends, the screen will also display which transmitters failed, if any.

The other option is the transmitter survey LED operation that is built into all 1100 Series wireless products. Each wireless transmitter has a red LED built-in that provides visual confirmation that the transmitter is able to transmit messages to the wireless receiver. By pressing and holding the tamper switch on the transmitter, the LED should blink one time. DMP recommends repeating this test several times to confirm reliable communication. If the LED turns on for more than one second, or if the LED is flashing multiple times, relocate the wireless receiver until the transmitter is consistently showing the LED turning on for less than a second each time the tamper is pressed.

Push notifications have to be enabled on the phone, and the user must select which push notifications they want to receive. The user is able to choose from Alarms, Troubles, and Arms/Disarms in the settings tab of the Virtual Keypad app. Additional push notifications can be sent for sensor activity. Sensor activity must be enabled on the system in dealeradmin.securecomwireless.com for users to see that as an option in their app. Users can choose to receive sensor activity from up to 10 different zones programmed into the panel.

Push notifications will work with the primary communication type matching what is in Dealer Admin. If the system is using EasyConnect in Dealer Admin the panel's main communication needs to be Network or WiFi. If the system is using Cell in Dealer Admin the panel's communication needs to be Cellular.

While DMP Technical Support is happy to help answer your programming questions no DMP employee is permitted to change your programming.

In order for EASYconnect connections for the Virtual Keypad app to work, the control panel must be programmed with the App Key that is specific to each DMP dealer. To find the App Key, each dealer can look at the dealer settings tab within dealeradmin.securecomwireless.com. The App Key is then programmed into Remote Options of panel programming. EasyNet connections are available on network XT Series panels v112 10/5/2012, XR150/350/550 and XTLplus/XTLTouch control panels.

The 734 or module that is controlling a door must have the area the user wants to access and disarm programmed in the access area for the device in device setup. Users who swipe at the reader must also have a profile that has the ability to access and disarm that same area(s) that was assigned in device setup.










Note: Please be aware of any existing hardwired zones or hard-wired outputs that are already programmed on the LX expansion bus.



Zone Number

XT30/50 & XTL/XTLC

31-34 & 41-44


51-54 & 61-64

XR100/500 & XR150/350/550


For the 7000 Series keypads, simply press and hold the back arrow and CMD at the same time until the keypad shows "SET BRIGHTNESS." When that appears on the screen, press 3-5-7-7 (I-N-S-T) CMD. The screen will then show the current keypad address, which is 1 by default. To change the address, press any of the top row keys to clear out the existing setting and then insert the desired keypad address. Don’t forget to program the device number in Device Setup panel programming to make sure the keypad will be operational when you change the address.For 7800 or 9800 Series keypads, scroll the keypad carousel until you see OPTIONS and select it. On the next screen, tap on the wrench and enter code 3-5-7-7 (I-N-S-T) CMD to enter installer options. The first screen to appear is KPD OPT, KPD DIAG, KPD STOP. Select OPT and the current keypad address will be displayed. Select the existing setting to clear out the current address and enter in the new address. Don’t forget to program the device number that you set your keypad to in Device Setup of panel programming to make sure the keypad will be operational when you change the address.

XT30/50, XTL, XTLplus and XTLtouch: The XT and XTL Series panels can only be connected and programmed via network, cell, or dialer on XT30/50D. A 399 cable can only be used to directly update the panel firmware. In Remote Link, set the connection type to Direct with a baud rate of 38400 when updating the XT Series panels.

XR100/500: The XR100/500 can be connected and programmed via network, dialer, cell, and serial. The XR100/500 Series can update firmware with network or serial.*Note: Serial connections MUST be done on the J22 header or J21 DB9 connecter with the J23 jumper set to R. In Remote Link this would require a connection type of Direct with a baud rate of 9600.

XR150/350/550: The XR150/350/550 can be connected and programmed via network, dialer, cell, and serial. The XR150/350/550 Series can be updated via network or serial.*Note: Serial connections must be done on the LX500 header using a 399 cable. To enable the header you must go to diagnostics (2-3-1-3 CMD) and select PC Programmer and connect within 60 seconds. In Remote Link this would require a connection type of direct with a baud rate of 38400.

Cellcom/iCom/DualCom: The Cellcom/iCom/DualCom Series panels can only be connected and programmed via cellular communication. If you need to update to a new firmware version, a 399 cable can be used to directly update. The connection type for firmware updates is Direct and the baud rate would be 38400.

Here is a list of possible access denied messages you would find in the panel event history and their meaning.

Access Denied Message


Invalid Code

The code read from the card does not match any user in the panel.

Invalid Time

Access was attempted outside of the schedule assigned to the user’s profile.

Invalid Area

User attempted to access and area that is not defined in their profile.

Invalid Level

Door access is not enabled in the user’s profile.

Armed Area

User attempted to access an armed area they do not have the authority to disarm.

Inactive User

User is marked as inactive in User Codes.

On XR150/350/550 panels version 112 3/22/16, and XT30/50 panels version 122 4/5/15, and XTLPlus/XTLTouch panels, the OTA happens automatically and does not need to be performed manually.Access the Diagnostics menu, reset the control panel by shorting the RESET header or pressing the RESET button on the panel, then go to a keypad and press 2-3-1-3 (D-I-A-G). The  keypad will display "DIAGNOSTICS." Continue hitting CMD until the option "ACTIVATE CELL" appears on the screen. Press any button under the activate display on the screen and then Yes when it asks for confirmation to finalize the activation of the CDMA modem. To perform the cellular activation process from the keypad, the panel must be in contact with a Verizon-owned tower. If the activation is unsuccessful, the modem will need to be activated elsewhere and brought back on site. 

The most common source of address conflicts are from wireless zones that occupy the same address as the keypad. For example, the keypad is currently set at address 1 and wireless zones 11-14 were just added. The keypad address will need to be changed, or the zones can be reprogrammed at the next available address.

Repeaters are programmed as zones in the control panel. If you have multiple repeaters going in on the same system, they must be programmed with sequential zone numbers. Repeaters should be programmed as auxiliary type zones with disarmed open and disarmed short messages set to trouble and armed open and armed short messages set to alarm in advanced zone programming.

The XT50 Wireless Antenna terminal block J20 is located at the top right corner of the circuit board. The antenna installs through a small opening in the top of the enclosure and is attached to the panel using the right terminal. The left terminal is not used.

Replace the battery and perform a sensor reset.

Источник: [https://torrent-igruha.org/3551-portal.html]
500 Cards v1.10 serial key or number


In cryptography, X.509 is a standard defining the format of public key certificates.[1] X.509 certificates are used in many Internet protocols, including TLS/SSL, which is the basis for HTTPS,[2] the secure protocol for browsing the web. They are also used in offline applications, like electronic signatures. An X.509 certificate contains a public key and an identity (a hostname, or an organization, or an individual), and is either signed by a certificate authority or self-signed. When a certificate is signed by a trusted certificate authority, or validated by other means, someone holding that certificate can rely on the public key it contains to establish secure communications with another party, or validate documents digitally signed by the corresponding private key.

X.509 also defines certificate revocation lists, which are a means to distribute information about certificates that have been deemed invalid by a signing authority, as well as a certification path validation algorithm, which allows for certificates to be signed by intermediate CA certificates, which are, in turn, signed by other certificates, eventually reaching a trust anchor.

X.509 is defined by the International Telecommunications Union's "Standardization Sector" (ITU-T), in ITU-T Study Group 17 and is based on ASN.1, another ITU-T standard.

History and usage[edit]

X.509 was initially issued on July 3, 1988 and was begun in association with the X.500 standard. It assumes a strict hierarchical system of certificate authorities (CAs) for issuing the certificates. This contrasts with web of trust models, like PGP, where anyone (not just special CAs) may sign and thus attest to the validity of others' key certificates. Version 3 of X.509 includes the flexibility to support other topologies like bridges and meshes.[2] It can be used in a peer-to-peer, OpenPGP-like web of trust,[citation needed] but was rarely used that way as of 2004[update]. The X.500 system has only been implemented by sovereign nations[which?] for state identity information sharing treaty fulfillment purposes, and the IETF's public-key infrastructure (X.509), or PKIX, working group has adapted the standard to the more flexible organization of the Internet. In fact, the term X.509 certificate usually refers to the IETF's PKIX certificate and CRL Profile of the X.509 v3 certificate standard, as specified in RFC 5280, commonly called PKIX for Public Key Infrastructure (X.509).[3]


In the X.509 system, an organization that wants a signed certificate requests one via a certificate signing request (CSR).

To do this, it first generates a key pair, keeping the private key secret and using it to sign the CSR. This contains information identifying the applicant and the applicant's public key that is used to verify the signature of the CSR - and the Distinguished Name (DN) that the certificate is for. The CSR may be accompanied by other credentials or proofs of identity required by the certificate authority.

The certification authority issues a certificate binding a public key to a particular distinguished name.

An organization's trusted root certificates can be distributed to all employees so that they can use the company PKI system.[citation needed] Browsers such as Internet Explorer, Firefox, Opera, Safari and Chrome come with a predetermined set of root certificates pre-installed, so SSL certificates from major certificate authorities will work instantly; in effect the browsers' developers determine which CAs are trusted third parties for the browsers' users.[citation needed] For example, Firefox provides a CSV and/or HTML file containing a list of Included CAs.[4]

X.509 and RFC 5280 also include standards for certificate revocation list (CRL) implementations. Another IETF-approved way of checking a certificate's validity is the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Firefox 3 enables OCSP checking by default, as do versions of Windows from at least Vista and later.[5]

Structure of a certificate[edit]

The structure foreseen by the standards is expressed in a formal language, Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1).

The structure of an X.509 v3 digital certificate is as follows:

  • Certificate
    • Version Number
    • Serial Number
    • Signature Algorithm ID
    • Issuer Name
    • Validity period
    • Subject name
    • Subject Public Key Info
      • Public Key Algorithm
      • Subject Public Key
    • Issuer Unique Identifier (optional)
    • Subject Unique Identifier (optional)
    • Extensions (optional)
  • Certificate Signature Algorithm
  • Certificate Signature

Each extension has its own ID, expressed as object identifier, which is a set of values, together with either a critical or non-critical indication. A certificate-using system must reject the certificate if it encounters a critical extension that it does not recognize, or a critical extension that contains information that it cannot process. A non-critical extension may be ignored if it is not recognized, but must be processed if it is recognized.[6]

The structure of version 1 is given in RFC 1422.[7]

ITU-T introduced issuer and subject unique identifiers in version 2 to permit the reuse of issuer or subject name after some time. An example of reuse will be when a CA goes bankrupt and its name is deleted from the country's public list. After some time another CA with the same name may register itself, even though it is unrelated to the first one. However, IETF recommends that no issuer and subject names be reused. Therefore, version 2 is not widely deployed in the Internet.[citation needed]

Extensions were introduced in version 3. A CA can use extensions to issue a certificate only for a specific purpose (e.g. only for signing digital objects).

In all versions, the serial number must be unique for each certificate issued by a specific CA (as mentioned in RFC 5280).

Extensions informing a specific usage of a certificate[edit]

RFC 5280 (and its predecessors) defines a number of certificate extensions which indicate how the certificate should be used. Most of them are arcs from the OID. Some of the most common, defined in section 4.2.1, are:

  • Basic Constraints, ,[8] are used to indicate whether the certificate belongs to a CA.
  • Key Usage, ,[9] provides a bitmap specifying the cryptographic operations which may be performed using the public key contained in the certificate; for example, it could indicate that the key should be used for signatures but not for encipherment.
  • Extended Key Usage, ,[10] is used, typically on a leaf certificate, to indicate the purpose of the public key contained in the certificate. It contains a list of OIDs, each of which indicates an allowed use. For example, indicates that the key may be used on the server end of a TLS or SSL connection; indicates that the key may be used to secure email.

In general, if a certificate has several extensions restricting its use, all restrictions must be satisfied for a given use to be appropriate. RFC 5280 gives the specific example of a certificate containing both keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage: in this case, both must be processed and the certificate can only be used if both extensions are coherent in specifying the usage of a certificate. For example, NSS uses both extensions to specify certificate usage.[11]

Certificate filename extensions[edit]

There are several commonly used filename extensions for X.509 certificates. Unfortunately, some of these extensions are also used for other data such as private keys.

  • – (Privacy-enhanced Electronic Mail) Base64 encoded DER certificate, enclosed between "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" and "-----END CERTIFICATE-----"
  • , , – usually in binary DER form, but Base64-encoded certificates are common too (see above)
  • , – PKCS#7 SignedData structure without data, just certificate(s) or CRL(s)
  • – PKCS#12, may contain certificate(s) (public) and private keys (password protected)
  • – PFX, predecessor of PKCS#12 (usually contains data in PKCS#12 format, e.g., with PFX files generated in IIS)

PKCS#7 is a standard for signing or encrypting (officially called "enveloping") data. Since the certificate is needed to verify signed data, it is possible to include them in the SignedData structure. A file is a degenerated SignedData structure, without any data to sign.[citation needed]

PKCS#12 evolved from the personal information exchange (PFX) standard and is used to exchange public and private objects in a single file.[citation needed]

Certificate chains and cross-certification[edit]

A certificate chain (see the equivalent concept of "certification path" defined by RFC 5280)[12] is a list of certificates (usually starting with an end-entity certificate) followed by one or more CA certificates (usually the last one being a self-signed certificate), with the following properties:

  1. The Issuer of each certificate (except the last one) matches the Subject of the next certificate in the list
  2. Each certificate (except the last one) is signed by the secret key corresponding to the next certificate in the chain (i.e. the signature of one certificate can be verified using the public key contained in the following certificate)
  3. The last certificate in the list is a trust anchor: a certificate that you trust because it was delivered to you by some trustworthy procedure

Certificate chains are used in order to check that the public key (PK) contained in a target certificate (the first certificate in the chain) and other data contained in it effectively belongs to its subject. In order to ascertain this, the signature on the target certificate is verified by using the PK contained in the following certificate, whose signature is verified using the next certificate, and so on until the last certificate in the chain is reached. As the last certificate is a trust anchor, successfully reaching it will prove that the target certificate can be trusted.

The description in the preceding paragraph is a simplified view on the certification path validation process as defined by RFC 5280,[12] which involves additional checks, such as verifying validity dates on certificates, looking up CRLs, etc.

Example 1: Cross-certification between two PKIs
Example 2: CA certificate renewal

Examining how certificate chains are built and validated, it is important to note that a concrete certificate can be part of very different certificate chains (all of them valid). This is because several CA certificates can be generated for the same subject and public key, but be signed with different private keys (from different CAs or different private keys from the same CA). So, although a single X.509 certificate can have only one issuer and one CA signature, it can be validly linked to more than one certificate, building completely different certificate chains. This is crucial for cross-certification between PKIs and other applications.[13] See the following examples:

In these diagrams:

  • Each box represents a certificate, with its Subject in bold
  • A → B means "A is signed by B" (or, more precisely, "A is signed by the secret key corresponding to the public key contained in B").
  • Certificates with the same color (that are not white/transparent) contain the same public key

Example 1: Cross-certification at root Certification Authority (CA) level between two PKIs[edit]

In order to manage that user certificates existing in PKI 2 (like "User 2") are trusted by PKI 1, CA1 generates a certificate (cert2.1) containing the public key of CA2.[14] Now both "cert2 and cert2.1 (in green) have the same subject and public key, so there are two valid chains for cert2.2 (User 2): "cert2.2 → cert2" and "cert2.2 → cert2.1 → cert1".

Similarly, CA2 can generate a certificate (cert1.1) containing the public key of CA1 so that user certificates existing in PKI 1 (like "User 1") are trusted by PKI 2.

Example 2: CA certificate renewal[edit]

Understanding Certification Path Construction(PDF). PKI Forum. September 2002.

Since both cert1 and cert3 contain the same public key (the old one), there are two valid certificate chains for cert5: "cert5 → cert1" and "cert5 → cert3 → cert2", and analogously for cert6. This allows that old user certificates (such as cert5) and new certificates (such as cert6) can be trusted indifferently by a party having either the new root CA certificate or the old one as trust anchor during the transition to the new CA keys.[15]

Sample X.509 certificates[edit]

This is an example of a decoded X.509 certificate that was used by wikipedia.org and several other Wikipedia websites. It was issued by GlobalSign, as stated in the Issuer field. Its Subject field describes Wikipedia as an organization, and its Subject Alternative Name field describes the hostnames for which it could be used. The Subject Public Key Info field contains an ECDSA public key, while the signature at the bottom was generated by GlobalSign's RSA private key.

End-entity certificate[edit]

Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 10:e6:fc:62:b7:41:8a:d5:00:5e:45:b6 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G2 Validity Not Before: Nov 21 08:00:00 2016 GMT Not After : Nov 22 07:59:59 2017 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., CN=*.wikipedia.org Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub: 00:c9:22:69:31:8a:d6:6c:ea:da:c3:7f:2c:ac:a5: af:c0:02:ea:81:cb:65:b9:fd:0c:6d:46:5b:c9:1e: 9d:3b:ef ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Agreement Authority Information Access: CA Issuers - URI:http://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/gsorganizationvalsha2g2r1.crt OCSP - URI:http://ocsp2.globalsign.com/gsorganizationvalsha2g2 X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: CPS: https://www.globalsign.com/repository/ Policy: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.globalsign.com/gs/gsorganizationvalsha2g2.crl X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:*.wikipedia.org, DNS:*.m.mediawiki.org, DNS:*.m.wikibooks.org, DNS:*.m.wikidata.org, DNS:*.m.wikimedia.org, DNS:*.m.wikimediafoundation.org, DNS:*.m.wikinews.org, DNS:*.m.wikipedia.org, DNS:*.m.wikiquote.org, DNS:*.m.wikisource.org, DNS:*.m.wikiversity.org, DNS:*.m.wikivoyage.org, DNS:*.m.wiktionary.org, DNS:*.mediawiki.org, DNS:*.planet.wikimedia.org, DNS:*.wikibooks.org, DNS:*.wikidata.org, DNS:*.wikimedia.org, DNS:*.wikimediafoundation.org, DNS:*.wikinews.org, DNS:*.wikiquote.org, DNS:*.wikisource.org, DNS:*.wikiversity.org, DNS:*.wikivoyage.org, DNS:*.wiktionary.org, DNS:*.wmfusercontent.org, DNS:*.zero.wikipedia.org, DNS:mediawiki.org, DNS:w.wiki, DNS:wikibooks.org, DNS:wikidata.org, DNS:wikimedia.org, DNS:wikimediafoundation.org, DNS:wikinews.org, DNS:wikiquote.org, DNS:wikisource.org, DNS:wikiversity.org, DNS:wikivoyage.org, DNS:wiktionary.org, DNS:wmfusercontent.org, DNS:wikipedia.org X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 28:2A:26:2A:57:8B:3B:CE:B4:D6:AB:54:EF:D7:38:21:2C:49:5C:36 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:96:DE:61:F1:BD:1C:16:29:53:1C:C0:CC:7D:3B:83:00:40:E6:1A:7C Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 8b:c3:ed:d1:9d:39:6f:af:40:72:bd:1e:18:5e:30:54:23:35: ...

To validate this end-entity certificate, one needs an intermediate certificate that matches its Issuer and Authority Key Identifier:

Issuer C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G2
Authority Key Identifier 96:DE:61:F1:BD:1C:16:29:53:1C:C0:CC:7D:3B:83:00:40:E6:1A:7C

In a TLS connection, a properly-configured server would provide the intermediate as part of the handshake. However, it's also possible to retrieve the intermediate certificate by fetching the "CA Issuers" URL from the end-entity certificate.

Intermediate certificate[edit]

This is an example of an intermediate certificate belonging to a certificate authority. This certificate signed the end-entity certificate above, and was signed by the root certificate below. Note that the subject field of this intermediate certificate matches the issuer field of the end-entity certificate that it signed. Also, the "subject key identifier" field in the intermediate matches the "authority key identifier" field in the end-entity certificate.

Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 04:00:00:00:00:01:44:4e:f0:42:47 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA Validity Not Before: Feb 20 10:00:00 2014 GMT Not After : Feb 20 10:00:00 2024 GMT Subject: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G2 Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public-Key: (2048 bit) Modulus: 00:c7:0e:6c:3f:23:93:7f:cc:70:a5:9d:20:c3:0e: ... Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Certificate Sign, CRL Sign X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:TRUE, pathlen:0 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 96:DE:61:F1:BD:1C:16:29:53:1C:C0:CC:7D:3B:83:00:40:E6:1A:7C X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: X509v3 Any Policy CPS: https://www.globalsign.com/repository/ X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.globalsign.net/root.crl Authority Information Access: OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.globalsign.com/rootr1 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:60:7B:66:1A:45:0D:97:CA:89:50:2F:7D:04:CD:34:A8:FF:FC:FD:4B Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 46:2a:ee:5e:bd:ae:01:60:37:31:11:86:71:74:b6:46:49:c8: ...

Root certificate[edit]

This is an example of a self-signed root certificate representing a certificate authority. Its issuer and subject fields are the same, and its signature can be validated with its own public key. Validation of the trust chain has to end here. If the validating program has this root certificate in its trust store, the end-entity certificate can be considered trusted for use in a TLS connection. Otherwise, the end-entity certificate is considered untrusted.

Certificate:[16] Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 04:00:00:00:00:01:15:4b:5a:c3:94 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA Validity Not Before: Sep 1 12:00:00 1998 GMT Not After : Jan 28 12:00:00 2028 GMT Subject: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public-Key: (2048 bit) Modulus: 00:da:0e:e6:99:8d:ce:a3:e3:4f:8a:7e:fb:f1:8b: ... Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Certificate Sign, CRL Sign X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:TRUE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 60:7B:66:1A:45:0D:97:CA:89:50:2F:7D:04:CD:34:A8:FF:FC:FD:4B Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption d6:73:e7:7c:4f:76:d0:8d:bf:ec:ba:a2:be:34:c5:28:32:b5: ...


There are a number of publications about PKI problems by Bruce Schneier, Peter Gutmann and other security experts.[17][18][19]

Architectural weaknesses[edit]

  • Use of blocklisting invalid certificates (using CRLs and OCSP),
    • If the client only trusts certificates when CRLs are available, then they lose the offline capability that makes PKI attractive. So most clients do trust certificates when CRLs are not available, but in that case an attacker that controls the communication channel can disable the CRLs. Adam Langley of Google has said soft-fail CRL checks are like a safety belt that works except when you have an accident.[20]
  • CRLs are notably a poor choice because of large sizes and convoluted distribution patterns,
  • Ambiguous OCSP semantics and lack of historical revocation status,
  • Revocation of root certificates is not addressed,
  • Aggregation problem: Identity claims (authenticate with an identifier), attribute claims (submit a bag of vetted attributes), and policy claims are combined in a single container. This raises privacy, policy mapping, and maintenance issues.[clarification needed]
  • Delegation problem: CAs cannot technically restrict subordinate CAs from issuing certificates outside a limited namespaces or attribute set; this feature of X.509 is not in use. Therefore, a large number of CAs exist on the Internet, and classifying them and their policies is an insurmountable task. Delegation of authority within an organization cannot be handled at all, as in common business practice.
  • Federation problem: Certificate chains that are the result of subordinate CAs, bridge CAs, and cross-signing make validation complex and expensive in terms of processing time. Path validation semantics may be ambiguous. The hierarchy with a third-party trusted party is the only model. This is inconvenient when a bilateral trust relationship is already in place.
  • Issuance of an Extended Validation (EV) certificate for a hostname doesn't prevent issuance of a lower-validation certificate valid for the same hostname, which means that the higher validation level of EV doesn't protect against man-in-the-middle attacks.[21]

Problems with certificate authorities[edit]

  • The subject, not the relying party, purchases certificates. The subject will often utilize the cheapest issuer, so quality is not being paid for in the competing market. This is partly addressed by Extended Validation certificates, yet trust value in the eyes of security experts are diminishing[22]
  • Certification authorities deny almost all warranties to the user (including subject or even relying parties)
  • "Users use an undefined certification request protocol to obtain a certificate which is published in an unclear location in a nonexistent directory with no real means to revoke it"[19]
  • Like all businesses, CAs are subject to the legal jurisdictions they operate within, and may be legally compelled to compromise the interests of their customers and their users. Intelligence agencies have also made use of false certificates issued through extralegal compromise of CAs, such as DigiNotar, to carry out man-in-the-middle attacks.[citation needed] Another example is a revocation request of the CA of the Dutch government, because of a new Dutch law becoming active starting January 1, 2018, giving new powers for the Dutch intelligence and security services[23]

Implementation issues[edit]

Implementations suffer from design flaws, bugs, different interpretations of standards and lack of interoperability of different standards. Some problems are:[citation needed]

  • Many implementations turn off revocation check:
    • Seen as obstacle, policies are not enforced
    • If it was turned on in all browsers by default, including code signing, it would probably crash the infrastructure[citation needed]
  • DNs are complex and little understood (lack of canonicalization, internationalization problems)
  • rfc822Name has two notations
  • Name and policy constraints hardly supported
  • Key usage ignored, first certificate in a list being used
  • Enforcement of custom OIDs is difficult
  • Attributes should not be made critical because it makes clients crash[citation needed]
  • Unspecified length of attributes lead to product-specific limits
  • There are implementation errors with X.509 that allow e.g. falsified subject names using null-terminated strings[24] or code injection attacks in certificates
  • By using illegal[25] 0x80 padded subidentifiers of object identifiers, wrong implementations or by using integer overflows of the client's browsers, an attacker can include an unknown attribute in the CSR, which the CA will sign, which the client wrongly interprets as "CN" (OID= Dan Kaminsky at the 26th Chaos Communication Congress "Black OPs of PKI"[26]

Cryptographic weaknesses[edit]

Digital signature systems depend on secure cryptographic hash functions to work. When a public key infrastructure allows the use of a hash function that is no longer secure, an attacker can exploit weaknesses in the hash function to forge certificates. Specifically, if an attacker is able to produce a hash collision, they can convince a CA to sign a certificate with innocuous contents, where the hash of those contents is identical to the hash of another, malicious set of certificate contents, created by the attacker with values of their choosing. The attacker can then append the CA-provided signature to their malicious certificate contents, resulting in a malicious certificate that appears to be signed by the CA. Because the malicious certificate contents are chosen solely by the attacker, they can have different validity dates or hostnames than the innocuous certificate. The malicious certificate can even contain a "CA: true" field making it able to issue further trusted certificates.

  • MD2-based certificates were used for a long time and were vulnerable to preimage attacks. Since the root certificate already had a self-signature, attackers could use this signature and use it for an intermediate certificate.
  • In 2005, Arjen Lenstra and Benne de Weger demonstrated "how to use hash collisions to construct two X.509 certificates that contain identical signatures and that differ only in the public keys", achieved using a collision attack on the MD5 hash function.[27]
  • In 2008, Alexander Sotirov and Marc Stevens presented at the Chaos Communication Congress a practical attack that allowed them to create a rogue Certificate Authority, accepted by all common browsers, by exploiting the fact that RapidSSL was still issuing X.509 certificates based on MD5.[28]
  • In April 2009 at the Eurocrypt Conference,[29] Australian Researchers of Macquarie University presented "Automatic Differential Path Searching for SHA-1".[30] The researchers were able to deduce a method which increases the likelihood of a collision by several orders of magnitude.[31]
  • In February 2017, a group of researchers led by Marc Stevens produced a SHA-1 collision, demonstrating SHA-1's weakness.[32]

Mitigations for cryptographic weaknesses[edit]

Exploiting a hash collision to forge X.509 signatures requires that the attacker be able to predict the data that the certificate authority will sign. This can be somewhat mitigated by the CA generating a random component in the certificates it signs, typically the serial number. The CA/Browser Forum has required serial number entropy in its Baseline Requirements Section 7.1 since 2011.[33]

As of January 1, 2016[update], the Baseline Requirements forbid issuance of certificates using SHA-1. As of early 2017[update], Chrome[34] and Firefox[35] reject certificates that use SHA-1. As of May 2017[update] both Edge[36] and Safari[37] are also rejecting SHA-1 certificate. Non-browser X.509 validators do not yet reject SHA-1 certificates.[38]

PKI standards for X.509[edit]

PKIX Working Group[edit]

In 1995, the Internet Engineering Task Force in conjunction with the National Institute of Standards and Technology[44] formed the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) working group. The working group, concluded in June 2014,[45] is commonly referred to as "PKIX." It produced RFCs and other standards documentation on using deploying X.509 in practice. In particular it produced RFC 3280 and its successor RFC 5280, which define how to use X.509 in Internet protocols.

Major protocols and standards using X.509 certificates[edit]

TLS/SSL and HTTPS use the RFC 5280 profile of X.509, as do S/MIME (Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) and the EAP-TLS method for WiFi authentication. Any protocol that uses TLS, such as SMTP, POP, IMAP, LDAP, XMPP, and many more, inherently uses X.509.

IPSec can use the RFC 4945 profile for authenticating peers.

The OpenCable security specification defines its own profile of X.509 for use in the cable industry.

Devices like smart cards and TPMs often carry certificates to identify themselves or their owners. These certificates are in X.509 form.

The WS-Security standard defines authentication either through TLS or through its own certificate profile.[16] Both methods use X.509.

The Microsoft Authenticode code signing system uses X.509 to identify authors of computer programs.

The OPC UA industrial automation communication standard uses X.509.

SSH generally uses a Trust On First Use security model and doesn't have need for certificates. However, the popular OpenSSH implementation does support a CA-signed identity model based on its own non-X.509 certificate format.[46]

See also[edit]


  1. ^"X.509: Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks". ITU. Retrieved 6 November 2019.
  2. ^ abRFC 4158
  3. ^"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile". May 2008. Retrieved 29 May 2020.
  4. ^"CA:IncludedCAs". Mozilla Wiki. Retrieved 17 January 2017.
  5. ^"Bug 110161 - (ocspdefault) enable OCSP by default". Mozilla. Retrieved 17 March 2016.
  6. ^"RFC 5280 section 4.2". Tools. IETF. May 2008. Retrieved 12 February 2013.
  7. ^RFC 1422
  8. ^"RFC 5280, Section 'Basic Constraints'".
  9. ^"'RFC 5280, Section 'Key Usage'".
  10. ^"RFC 5280, Section 'Extended Key Usage'".
  11. ^Nelson B Boyard (9 May 2002). "All About Certificate Extensions". Mozilla. Retrieved 10 September 2020.
  12. ^ ab"Certification Path Validation". Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. Network Working Group. 2008.
  13. ^Lloyd, Steve (September 2002). Understanding Certification Path Construction(PDF). PKI Forum.
  14. ^"Cross-Certification Between Root CAs". Qualified Subordination Deployment Scenarios. Microsoft. August 2009.
  15. ^Nash; Duane; Joseph; Brink (2001). "Key and Certificate Life Cycles. CA Certificate Renewal". PKI: Implementing and Managing E-Security. RSA Press - Osborne/McGraw-Hill. ISBN .
  16. ^ ab"Web Services Security X.509 Token Profile Version 1.1.1". Oasis. Retrieved 14 March 2017.
  17. ^Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier. "Top 10 PKI risks"(PDF). Computer Security Journal (Volume XVI, Number 1, 2000).
  18. ^Peter Gutmann. "PKI: it's not dead, just resting"(PDF). IEEE Computer (Volume:35, Issue: 8).
  19. ^ abGutmann, Peter. "Everything you Never Wanted to Know about PKI but were Forced to Find Out"(PDF). Retrieved 14 November 2011.
  20. ^Langley, Adam (5 February 2012). "Revocation checking and Chrome's CRL". Imperial Violet. Retrieved 2 February 2017.
  21. ^Michael Zusman; Alexander Sotirov (July 2009). "Sub-Prime PKI: Attacking Extended Validation SSL"(PDF). Blackhat. Retrieved 10 September 2020.
  22. ^Hunt, Troy. "Extended Validation Certificates are Dead". TroyHunt.com. Retrieved 26 February 2019.
  23. ^van Pelt, Cris. "Logius: Dutch Government CA trust issue". Bugzilla. Retrieved 31 October 2017.
  24. ^Moxie Marlinspike (2009). "More Tricks for Defetaing SSL in Practice"(PDF). Institute For Disruptive Studies. Blackhat. Retrieved 10 September 2020.
  25. ^Rec. ITU-T X.690, clause 8.19.2
  26. ^Dan Kaminsky (29 December 2009). "26C3: Black Ops Of PKI". CCC Events Blog. Der Chaos Computer Club. Retrieved 29 September 2013.
  27. ^Lenstra, Arjen; de Weger, Benne (19 May 2005). On the possibility of constructing meaningful hash collisions for public keys(PDF) (Technical report). Lucent Technologies, Bell Laboratories & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven. Archived(PDF) from the original on 14 May 2013. Retrieved 28 September 2013.
  28. ^"MD5 considered harmful today". Eindhoven University of Technology. 16 June 2011. Retrieved 29 September 2013.
  29. ^"Eurocrypt 2009". International Association for Cryptologic Research.
  30. ^Cameron McDonald; Philip Hawkes; Josef Pieprzyk (2009). "SHA-1 collisions now"(PDF). Macquarie University and Qualcomm. Retrieved 10 September 2020.
  31. ^Dennis Dwyer (2 June 2009). "SHA-1 Collision Attacks Now 252". SecureWorks Insights. Retrieved 24 February 2016.
  32. ^Marc Stevens; Elie Bursztein; Pierre Karpman; Ange Albertini; Yarik Markov. "The first collision for full SHA-1"(PDF). CWI Amsterdam & Google Research. Retrieved 10 September 2020 – via Shattered.
  33. ^"Baseline Requirements Documents". CA Browser Forum. Retrieved 19 March 2017.
  34. ^Andrew Whalley (16 November 2016). "SHA-1 Certificates in Chrome". Google Online Security Blog. Retrieved 19 March 2017.
  35. ^"The end of SHA-1 on the Public Web". Mozilla Security Blog. Retrieved 19 March 2017.
  36. ^"Microsoft Security Advisory 4010323". Technet. Microsoft. Retrieved 16 May 2017.
  37. ^"Safari and WebKit do not support SHA-1 certificates". Apple Support. 16 August 2018. Retrieved 10 September 2020.
  38. ^
Источник: [https://torrent-igruha.org/3551-portal.html]

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